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SECONDARY MEANING AND RELIGION: AN ANALYSIS OF
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE COURTS
Eric D. Yordy* and Elizabeth Brown**
INTRODUCTION
[A]n image that began as an expression of faith was transformed.
—Justice Alito for the majority of the Court1
[U]sing the cross as a war memorial does not transform it into a
secular symbol . . . .
—Justice Ginsburg for the dissent2
In the Supreme Court’s most recent freedom of religion case, Justice Alito and
Justice Ginsburg disagreed about the actual and potential meaning of the Latin cross,
a traditional symbol of Christianity in which the upright leg of the cross is longer
than the horizontal arms of the cross.3 Justice Alito stated that the Latin cross, while
not losing its religious meaning, has acquired what might be called a “secondary
meaning” as a symbol of World War I.4 He couched his analysis in language sug-
gesting that a religious symbol’s meaning may depend on its circumstances.5 While he
also denied that he is minimizing the religious importance of the symbol, he continued
to revisit the language of the secondary meaning, suggesting that the symbol simply
is not religious in certain contexts.6
Justice Ginsburg, in contrast, argued that “[t]he Latin cross is the foremost symbol
of the Christian faith” and that its use in a “war memorial does not transform it into
a secular symbol.”7 The disagreement among the Justices with regard to the charac-
terization of religious symbols in this 2019 case is the result of many years of
struggle by the Court in dealing with religious symbols and the Establishment
* Associate Professor, The W.A. Franke College of Business at Northern Arizona
University.
** Associate Professor of Business Law at Bentley University.
1 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2075 (2019).
2 Id. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3 Compare id. at 2089–90 (majority opinion) (noting importance of the cross as a symbol
matched to Christianity), with id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the cross does
not lose its Christian meaning because it was used as a war symbol).
4 See id. at 2089–90 (majority opinion).
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 Id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Clause.8 This is the first time, however, that a Justice has used language reminiscent
of trademark’s secondary meaning doctrine in trying to assess whether the use of a
religious symbol by a government entity violates the Establishment Clause.9 This
marks a significant potential shift in the Court’s approach to religious symbolism,
with potential consequences for the extent of the First Amendment’s guarantee of
free exercise rights.10
This Article looks at the conflicting views of the Court (in the majority opinion,
in concurrences, and in the dissenting opinion) on the nature of the religious symbol
and whether the symbol is changed by context and proposes a new type of analysis
that focuses on the context of the use of the symbol. In order to do this, we first look
in Part I at the various tests proposed by the Court in Establishment Clause cases, and
in particular, the analysis of religious symbols.11 Part II outlines some basic princi-
ples of trademark law to set the stage for Part III.12 There, we apply those trademark
principles to religious symbols to determine whether those principles are conducive
to an Establishment Clause analysis.13 Potential uses for trademark law principles
here include the determination of whether a symbol is a religious symbol, if a re-
ligious symbol might become a secular symbol, and how context might influence
the public perception of a religious symbol.14 We assess whether the Court’s use of
secondary meaning principles can be helpful to courts analyzing the use of religious
symbols and whether it violates the Establishment Clause.15 The closing paragraph
concludes that the principle of context is the key concept for religious symbol liti-
gation but acknowledges that the principles of secondary meaning may help clarify
a judge’s analysis of that context.16 We then propose a structured approach to the anal-
ysis that uses the idea of secondary meaning to assist a court in determining whether
the use of a religious symbol violates the Establishment Clause in a particular context.17
I. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN A SECULAR WORLD
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in part, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”18 While a narrow
8 See id. at 2081 n.16 (majority opinion) (listing different categories of Establishment Clause
cases); see also id. at 2080 (noting the changes within the Court’s attempts to interpret the
Establishment Clause over time).
9 See id. at 2081–85; id. at 2089–90.
10 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11 See infra Part I.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Section III.D.
17 See infra Section III.D.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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interpretation of this clause would prohibit a state-sponsored religion,19 the clause
has been interpreted more broadly over the years.20 From opinions about prayers in
schools and government meetings, to the use of state tax revenue to pay for play-
ground equipment at a religious school, the Supreme Court has struggled to clearly
define the parameters of the Establishment Clause.21
19 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
20 See cases cited infra note 21.
21 For a sample of cases addressing the use of public tax revenue to support programs in
religious organizations, see, for example, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017, 2024–25 (2017) (holding that the state could not deny a religious school
a grant based on Establishment Clause concerns when the grant was for non-religious pur-
poses and was open to all non-profit organizations except religious organizations); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–44, 653, 662–63 (2002) (holding that an Ohio “school
choice” tuition aid program that allowed for reimbursement for private school, including
religious school, tuition did not violate the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793, 801, 835 (2000) (holding that the provision of government aid for materials and equip-
ment to religious schools was not a violation of the Establishment Clause); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997) (holding that the provision of remedial education by public
school teachers did not violate the Establishment Clause when those services were provided
in a religious school); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (holding
that providing disability services to a student at a religious school did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when those services were provided at all public schools); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 784–86, 795 (1983) (upholding the use of public funds to pay a legislative chap-
lain based on a long history of such use of funds); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390, 400
(1983) (upholding tax deductions for tuition and other educational expenses even when the
taxpayer’s children attended religious schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07,
612–13 (1971) (holding that state payments directly to religious schools to reimburse for
salaries of teachers in secular subjects violated the Establishment Clause and introducing an
entanglement test); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 666, 680 (1970) (upholding property
tax exemptions for religious organizations); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (holding that tax
revenue could be used to pay for bus costs for students to attend school, even if they attend a
religious school); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 373, 375 (1930) (holding
that state tax dollars could be used to provide textbooks to children even if those children at-
tended religious schools). For cases involving religious activities in public facilities, see, for
example, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 564–70, 591–92 (2014) (holding that
opening prayers for legislative and government meetings do not violate the Establishment
Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000) (holding that prayer
at public high school sporting events violated the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 580, 589 (1992) (holding that the inclusion of religious prayers at a public
school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 40, 61 (1985) (holding that school prayer violated the Establishment Clause); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264–65, 277 (1981) (holding that the use of public school facilities
for religious organization meetings when school was not in session did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding
that a state law requiring Biblical readings in schools violated the Establishment Clause); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422, 424 (1962) (holding that prayer in school violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, even if students were not required to participate); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 308, 315 (1952) (holding that release time to allow students to leave a public school
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Although the Court has not heard many religious symbol cases, those it has
heard have been the source of great public concern.22 For example, the Court has
addressed whether a depiction of stone tablets engraved with the Ten Command-
ments hanging in a public courtroom or on the grounds of a public building violates
the Establishment Clause.23 The Court also has addressed when a menorah or a
crèche (manger scene) might violate the Establishment Clause.24 In the 2019 case
at issue here, the Court decided whether a thirty-two-foot-tall Latin cross on a
pedestal in the middle of a public roadway violated the Establishment Clause.25
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Establishes the Importance of Context in
Evaluating Government Action
From its earliest Establishment Clause opinions, the United States Supreme
Court has made it clear that the government is not allowed to interfere with the
opinions or beliefs of people, but that it may step in to regulate behavior that might
violate the peace and good order of society.26 The Court further articulated that the
purpose of the religion clauses is “to be . . . neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers.”27 However, in practice, it has been difficult
for the Court to establish a way to determine whether government action violates
these principles.28 Several different approaches, including varying tests, have arisen
in Supreme Court opinions.29 While each test is different, there is one common
theme: the context of the regulation is important.30
to obtain religious education as an elective course at a religious institution did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Illinois ex rel. McCullom v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205, 212
(1948) (holding that a program allowing religious education in public schools during the regular
school day violates the Establishment Clause). For general cases regarding the establishment
of religion by the government, see, for example, Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690
(1994) (holding that a state statute creating a special school district for a religious “enclave”
violated the Establishment Clause); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 453 (1961)
(holding that state laws requiring business to close on Sunday did not unconstitutionally advance
the Christian religion over religions that observed the Sabbath on other days of the week).
22 See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
23 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005) (holding that the display violated
the Establishment Clause).
24 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (holding that the display did not violate
the Establishment Clause).
25 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
26 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163–66 (1878) (holding that laws pro-
hibiting polygamy did not violate this line because polygamy was an act that historically was
against good order).
27 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
28 See cases cited supra note 21.
29 See infra Sections I.A.1–4.
30 See infra Sections I.A.1–4.
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1. The Lemon Test
In 1971, Chief Justice Warren Burger attempted to synthesize Supreme Court
precedent into a single test.31 The infamous and somewhat controversial Lemon test
outlined three questions. First, does the government action have a secular purpose?32
Second, does the principal effect of that government action advance or inhibit reli-
gion?33 Third, does the government action foster excessive entanglement with reli-
gion?34 In order for a government action to be valid and not violate the Establishment
Clause, a court must be able to answer the questions “yes,” “no,” and “no” in that
order.35 Because the test synthesized Establishment Clause cases with a broad range
of government actions, from tax relief to draft registration requirements, the test is
not easily applicable to religious symbols.36 Even so, the second prong of Lemon
takes the potential context of the government action into account in that the context
of the action may determine whether it advances or inhibits religion.37
2. The Historical Context Approach
The Lemon test, while providing a fair summary of prior Establishment Clause
opinions, was difficult for the Justices to apply.38 Within a dozen years, the Court
upheld opening prayers in legislative sessions based instead on a “deeply embedded”
history of legislative prayer in America.39 Chief Justice Burger began his analysis
with the words, “The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public
bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”40
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that history and tradition would not be enough
to justify a practice without other evidence, but declared that history and tradition
are “not something to be lightly cast aside.”41 Because the Founding Fathers began
meetings with prayer, the Chief Justice reasoned, “[T]he men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening
prayers as a violation of that Amendment . . . .”42 Justice Brennan, in dissent, applied
31 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
32 Id. at 612.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 613.
35 See id. at 613–14.
36 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080–81 (2019).
37 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
38 See Marcia Alembik, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establish-
ment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1180–92 (2006) (discussing the inconsistent usage
of the Lemon test by the Supreme Court).
39 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 790 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
42 Id. at 788.
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the Lemon test to demonstrate that “if any group of law students were asked to apply
the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly una-
nimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”43 Justice Brennan continued his
dissent by addressing the purposes of the Establishment Clause—separation and neu-
trality.44 Brennan concluded that prayer in a government building or in government
meetings should be a violation because prayer in that context violates the principles
of separation and neutrality.45 The Lemon test arguably is the most famous of the
Court’s Establishment Clause tests, but it has not been applied directly in many cases,
including the recent Latin cross case.46 But the Lemon test, despite several legal schol-
ars’ recommendations, has not been explicitly overruled or rejected by the Court.47
3. The Endorsement Test
In 1984, Justice O’Connor proposed that the underlying crux of an Establish-
ment Clause violation should be whether the government action is intended to, and
actually does, endorse religion over non-religion or endorse one particular religion
or sect over others.48 She saw the question as whether an action “sends a message to
non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community.”49 Given this language, the key factors in assessing an
Establishment Clause violation are intent and impact.50 Courts must look to the con-
text of the government action; if there is discernable intent to promote religion, or
a particular religion, then the action violates the Establishment Clause.51 Alterna-
tively, if intent cannot be discerned, the Court looks to the context of the action to
determine what message is being sent by the action.52
43 Id. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 801–06.
45 Id. at 808.
46 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019) (noting that several
cases established a pattern that is “a testament to the Lemon test’s shortcomings”).
47 See id. at 2092–93 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that the Lemon test has not
been used and does not explain many of the Court’s decisions, but not advocating for its
repudiation); see also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under
the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 326 (noting that “[t]wo cases at the end of the
1994 term rang the death knell of the Lemon test as an integrated whole”); Michael W.
McConnell, No More (Old) Symbol Cases, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 91, 106 (noting that
“[t]he death of Lemon is . . . welcome” because of its inconsistent and confusing applications).
But see Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would take the logical
next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.”).
48 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 688.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
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4. The Coercion Test
Instead of mere endorsement, Justice Kennedy proposed a coercion test in a
1989 dissent.53 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that religion has been, and continues
to be, an important factor in our society.54 To require the government to avoid any
action that might give credit to religion, or acknowledge religion, would be hostile
to religion and therefore would violate the principle that the government must be
neutral with regard to religion.55 Instead of setting an analytical bar at the level of
“endorsement” or “advance or inhibit,” Justice Kennedy argued for a coercion test
combined with a de facto establishment test.56 First, the government cannot under-
take any action that would coerce a person to “support or participate in any religion
or its exercise.”57 Second, it would violate the Establishment Clause if the govern-
ment gave a direct benefit to religion to such an extent that it was establishing a state
religion.58 In answering both questions, Kennedy argued that the context of the
government action would be critical.59
5. The Recent State of Establishment Clause Analysis and Justice Disagreements
In the thirty years since Kennedy’s proposal of the coercion test, the Court has
not settled on any unified analysis.60 In 1992, Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority
of the Court that holding prayer at school graduation violated the Establishment
Clause.61 Although the lower courts had applied the Lemon test, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion did not directly apply that test.62 Instead, it stated, “there are height-
ened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure
in the elementary and secondary public schools.”63 Even though participation in
graduation ceremonies is optional, the Court found that it is a seminal event in the
life of an American youth and to force a choice of attending such a major event or
being subjected to a religious prayer was unconstitutional.64 It appeared, in that case,
53 See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
54 See id. at 657.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 659.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992).
62 Id. at 592.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 595.
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that the key contextual consideration was location, in that the action took place at
a high school.65
On the question of whether using government funds for a sign language inter-
preter for a deaf student at a private, religious school violated the Establishment Clause,
the Court, while noting again that the lower courts used the Lemon test, focused only
on the context of a neutral use of state funds without reference to the prongs of
Lemon.66 The Court again essentially ignored the prongs of the Lemon test in 1994
when it held that a state statute creating a school district specifically for a religious
village was unconstitutional.67 Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, stated, “I write
separately only to note my disagreement with any suggestion that today’s decision
signals a departure from the principles described in Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . .”68 In
both cases, the key component appeared to be the context of the action.69
In 2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to several recent cases that failed to
apply the Lemon test, noting:
Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in
dealing with the sort of passive monument [a depiction of the
Ten Commandments] that Texas has erected on its Capitol
grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the
monument and by our Nation’s history.70
Again, context was crucial.71 This historical approach also was found in the
Justice Kennedy’s 2014 opinion upholding prayer at public meetings.72 This histori-
cal approach would play a large role again in the 2019 Latin Cross case before the
Supreme Court, discussed in more depth below.73
65 See id.
66 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3, 13–14 (1993).
67 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706–07 (1994).
68 Id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
70 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005).
71 See id.
72 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 571 (2014). Justice Kennedy was
joined by Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts in his historical analysis. Id. at 568. Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia concurred, and discussed the analysis in terms of coercion. See
id. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the predominantly
Christian nature of the prayer-givers demonstrated a lack of neutrality, but did not apply the
Lemon test. See id. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan also dissented and failed to
use the Lemon test, instead taking factual issue with the nature of the forum and whether Justice
Kennedy applied the historical analysis correctly. See id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
73 See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
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B. The Establishment Clause and Religious Symbols
In several cases, the Court has addressed whether the public display of religious
symbols violates the Establishment Clause.74 In particular, the Court has issued
opinions related to three religious symbols: holiday displays,75 the Ten Command-
ments,76 and the cross.77 The Court has struggled to articulate when a religious symbol
may be used constitutionally by the government or on government property.78 It has
approached each symbol differently and yet again, context has been a part of the
discussion regardless of the test used.79
1. Holiday Displays
In its first holiday display case, the Court addressed the public display of a
crèche, or manger scene, as part of a broader holiday display.80 The city of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island, erected an annual holiday display located on privately owned land
with components owned by the city.81 It included several holiday symbols not asso-
ciated with Christianity per se but with the secular aspects of Christmas: a Santa
Claus, a reindeer-pulled sleigh, red and white striped poles, a Christmas tree, lights,
large toys, a “Seasons Greetings” banner, as well as a crèche consisting of the tra-
ditional Christian manger scene with a baby Jesus, angel, shepherds, and wise men.82
This arrangement was challenged in court as a religious symbol.83 In analyzing the
constitutionality of the crèche’s inclusion, the Court acknowledged the occasional
intertwining of church and state: “In every Establishment Clause case, we must
reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary
intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the
Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible.”84
The Court held that while the crèche depicted a critical moment in Christianity,
its inclusion merely acknowledged the history of the Christmas holiday and was not
a violation of the Establishment Clause.85 Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court
was not bound by any particular test and argued for a contextual analysis with regard
74 See discussion infra Sections I.B.1–3.
75 See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
76 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
77 See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
78 See discussion infra Sections I.B.1–3.
79 See discussion infra Sections I.B.1–3.
80 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 672.
85 Id. at 686.
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to Establishment Clause cases.86 Because the crèche was passive (not forcing re-
ligion on any non-adherent), and was part of a larger display, the Chief Justice and
the majority held that it did not violate the Establishment Clause.87 Justice O’Connor,
in concurrence, argued for use of the endorsement test and determined that in that
context, the city did not endorse religion.88
Five years later, the Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test when
evaluating the context of another crèche in government displays in Pennsylvania.89
At issue were two different displays.90 In the first, the county allowed a religious
organization to set up a traditional crèche on the central staircase of the county
building, surrounded by some small poinsettia plants and evergreen trees decorated
with red ribbons.91 The second display was hosted in a city-county building just
down the street from the first display and was a broader holiday celebration containing
a Christmas tree and a menorah to acknowledge the Jewish holiday of Chanukah.92
This display included a sign with the words, “Salute to Liberty.”93 Because the
crèche display did not contain any “secular” holiday items to indicate that the crèche
was historic and not religious, the Court found that the crèche display was a reli-
gious display and violated the Establishment Clause.94 In contrast, through several
different opinions, a majority of the Justices found that the menorah, as part of a
broader display, did not violate the Establishment Clause.95 Justice Blackmun wrote:
The menorah, one must recognize, is a religious symbol; it
serves to commemorate the miracle of the oil as described in the
Talmud. But the menorah’s message is not exclusively religious.
The menorah is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like
Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions.96
Because the menorah was standing near a Christmas tree and the liberty sign,
Justice Blackmun believed that the display was a broad celebration of the holiday sea-
son and not an endorsement of religion.97 Justice O’Connor also found that the menorah
did not endorse religion because of its context with other holiday memorabilia.98
86 Id. at 685.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 687, 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
89 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989).
90 Id. at 578.
91 Id. at 578–80.
92 Id. at 581–82.
93 Id. at 582.
94 Id. at 598.
95 See id. at 613–14.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 614.
98 Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan, in dissent, opined that the inclusion of all religious symbols vio-
lated the Establishment Clause and stated, “I continue to believe that the display of
an object that ‘retains a specifically Christian [or other] religious meaning’ is in-
compatible with the separation of church and state demanded by our Constitution.”99
Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia argued that both the crèche and the
menorah displays did not violate the Establishment Clause because both were
passive acknowledgments of the religious nature and heritage of our country and did
not advance religion in any meaningful way.100 In fact forbidding those displays,
they argued, would be hostile to religion and a violation of the government’s duty
to accommodate religion.101
2. The Ten Commandments
The importance of context, as seen in the holiday display cases, was equally
important when the Court analyzed the placement of the Ten Commandments in
government buildings.102 In a 1980 per curiam opinion, the Court held that a Kentucky
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private do-
nations, in every public school classroom violated the Establishment Clause.103 Even
though the Kentucky legislature specified that the purpose of the display was to
provide context for the “fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States,” the Court held that its “pre-eminent purpose”
was religious.104 The Court stated, “The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact.”105 The Court noted that the display
violated the first prong of the Lemon test—that there was no true secular purpose for
the government action.106 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should
have deferred to the Kentucky legislature given its articulated secular purpose.107 He
further stated that “[t]he Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector
be insulated from all things which may have a religious significance or origin,”108
and the government should not ignore the historical significance of religious sym-
bols merely because it invokes religious imagery for some of the population.109
99 Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
100 Id. at 655, 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
101 Id.
102 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (per curiam).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 39.
105 Id. at 41.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 43–44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 45–46.
109 Id. at 46.
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Twenty-five years later, in 2005, the Supreme Court held that a display of the
Ten Commandments at the Texas state capitol building did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.110 In Van Orden v. Perry, a five-Justice majority agreed on the result,
but no majority agreed on the rationale.111 Four Justices, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy declined to apply the Lemon
test or the endorsement test, and instead looked to the historical significance of the
Ten Commandments as a foundation for our legal system.112 The plurality distin-
guished the monument at the Texas capitol from the display of the Commandments
in the Kentucky schools by underscoring the importance of context, noting that it had
been “particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause
in elementary and secondary schools.”113 Justice Breyer, concurring in the result,
focused on the context of the monument to conclude that the placement of the monu-
ment was intended to convey a secular, historical, and cultural message as opposed
to a religious message.114 After evaluating the history of the monument and its place-
ment on the capitol grounds, Justice Breyer opined that the monument served a “mixed
but primarily nonreligious purpose.”115 In a pair of dissents, Justices Stevens116 and
Souter117 focused on the nature of the monument and the clearly religious text of the
commandments to conclude that there is no possible secular purpose that would
overcome the presumption of religious purpose in using the Ten Commandments.118
On the same day that the Court held the display in Texas did not violate the
Establishment Clause, it also held that the Ten Commandments in Kentucky court-
rooms were placed there for religious purposes and so violated the Establishment
Clause.119 Two counties in Kentucky had placed copies of the Ten Commandments
on their courtroom walls.120 After complaints, the two counties passed resolutions for
broader displays, including not only the Ten Commandments, but also religious
quotes from other government documents such as the phrase “endowed by their Cre-
ator” from the Declaration of Independence.121 Following an injunction by the district
court, the counties put up modified displays including the Ten Commandments and
110 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 677 (2005).
111 Id. at 679.
112 Id. at 681–86.
113 Id. at 691 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987)).
114 Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
115 Id. at 703.
116 Id. at 721, 733–34 (Steven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[D]isplaying
this sectarian text at the state capitol should invoke a powerful presumption of invalidity [and
a commitment to neutrality].”).
117 Id. at 738 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the reality is that “the Ten Commandments
constitute a religious statement, that their message is inherently religious, and that the purpose
of singling them out in a display is clearly the same”).
118 Id. at 721 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005).
120 Id. at 851.
121 Id. at 853–54.
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several non-religious documents such as the Magna Carta.122 These displays were
again challenged.123 Justice Souter, for the majority, held that the purpose of the
display was a key factor in determining whether the government was acting in a neutral
manner toward religion or was establishing religion.124 In this case, the majority held
that any secular purpose for the displays would have to be assessed as genuine, and
not merely a sham to cover up a primarily religious purpose.125 The Court used the
Lemon test but included the notion of endorsement as part of the purpose analysis.126
The Court found that the district court had “ample support” to find that the purpose
was religious and upheld the lower court rulings that the display violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.127
3. The Latin Cross
The Latin cross first made its appearance in a Supreme Court case in the 1989
holiday display case, when Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion:
I do not doubt, for example, that the [Establishment] Clause
forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin
cross on the roof of city hall . . . . because such an obtrusive
year-round religious display would place the government’s
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion.128
In at least two cases, however, the Court has held that a Latin cross in a public
place does not violate the Establishment Clause.129 Less than a decade after Justice
Kennedy’s statement, the Court addressed the issue of the Latin cross on public
property.130 The public plaza surrounding the Ohio statehouse had been a public
forum for over 100 years.131 Regulations regarding the use of the square were
content neutral.132 Both public gatherings and unattended displays were allowed on
the square.133 The Ku Klux Klan applied for permission to put up an unattended
122 Id. at 855–56.
123 Id. at 856.
124 Id. at 862.
125 Id. at 864.
126 Id. at 860.
127 Id. at 881.
128 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989).
129 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019); Capitol Square Review
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758 (1995).
130 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 758.
131 Id. at 757.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 758.
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cross on the square, where permission already had been granted for a Christmas tree
and a menorah.134 The board that oversaw the application process denied the applica-
tion, stating that putting up a cross would violate the Establishment Clause because
of the appearance that the city “endorsed” the religious message of the cross.135
Because the square was open to all, the Court held that the board’s rationale of
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation was invalid and that the state must allow
the cross to be erected in the public forum.136 Justice Scalia specifically declined to
use the endorsement test in this case, calling the city’s defense an argument for
“transferred endorsement” where the government’s intentionally neutral activities
could not be turned into endorsement because of private action in a neutral setting.137
Justices O’Connor and Souter applied the endorsement test to determine that there
was no risk of perceived endorsement given the facts of this case.138
Thirty years after Justice Kennedy’s dicta about the Establishment Clause pro-
hibiting the placement of a Latin cross on the roof of a city building, in 2019, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a large Latin cross, located in a median of a major road,
did not violate the Establishment Clause.139 After World War I concluded, private
citizens in Prince George’s County, Maryland, raised money and erected a memorial
for forty-nine county residents who died in that war.140 The memorial, completed in
1925, was a thirty-two-foot-tall Latin cross.141 The memorial was located at the end
of the National Defense Highway—the connector route from Annapolis, Maryland,
to Washington, D.C.—which also has a history as a World War I memorial.142 When
the memorial was dedicated, religious leaders prayed at the ceremony, and the re-
ligious symbolism of the cross was mentioned by the U.S. Representative who
spoke.143 Because of the growth of the area as a major metropolitan center, in 1961,
the state of Maryland purchased the land and the memorial.144
134 Id.
135 Id. at 759.
136 Id. at 769.
137 Id. at 764.
138 Id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
139 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019). The Court did decide
one other case related to the Latin cross in 2010. In Salazar v. Buono, the issue, however, was
not whether the placement of the cross on federal land was a violation of the Establishment
Clause, but whether a Congressional action to exchange land upon which the cross sat to a
private party for an equivalent parcel of land was a violation of a prior, lower court order, to
remove the cross. 559 U.S. 700, 710 (2010). The Court declined to rule on the Establishment
Clause issue. See id. at 722–23. Instead, several separate opinions were issued concluding that
the district court erred. See id.
140 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2077.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2078.
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The memorial had been used repeatedly as part of patriotic, not religious, cele-
brations.145 The area surrounding the cross became a remembrance region, with
memorials to fallen soldiers from several wars and other tragic events in U.S. history,
including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.146 The cross memorial, however,
was separated by several hundred feet and sat on an island between lanes of traffic.147
In the majority opinion, Justice Alito noted that crosses may have both religious
and secular meanings.148 He pointed to the cross as a component of corporate logos
and national flags (Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Red Cross, and the flag of Switzer-
land for example) as examples of the cross’s conversion into an almost entirely
secular symbol.149 He then described the Latin cross as having religious meaning as
well as secular meaning through its association with World War I and the European
graveyards.150 Justice Alito, in a section joined by a plurality but not a majority,
discussed the problems with the Lemon test and declined to use it in that case.151
Instead, Justice Alito used a contextual argument to demonstrate that the cross is not
solely a religious symbol and that the context and use of the cross in this situation
was not religious.152 The majority further noted that even if the original purpose of
a display was religiously motivated, time may change the perception and purpose
of a religious display.153 The majority concluded that even if the origin and purpose
of the display had been religious initially, the message of the display may have evolved
from a religious message to a secular message.154 In dissent, Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor argued that the cross was so intimately associated with Christianity that
use in another setting does not change the meaning of the cross, but instead changes
the nature of the setting from secular to more sacred.155 Justice Ginsburg also noted
that soldiers’ headstones in Europe are not exclusively crosses, but include white
marble markers with a cross for Christian soldiers and a Star of David for Jewish
soldiers.156 This, she noted, indicated that those headstones were not secular markers,
but were religious markers and that any association of the cross with those cemeteries
stemmed, not from a secular association, but merely resulted from the statistics of
Christian dead to non-Christian dead.157
145 Id. at 2068–69.
146 Id. at 2077–78.
147 Id. at 2078.
148 Id. at 2074.
149 Id. at 2074–75.
150 Id. at 2075.
151 Id. at 2078–79.
152 Id. at 2089–90.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 2084 (pointing to the tragic 2019 fire at the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris and
statements by leaders that the cathedral was a cultural icon and a historic building without focus
on its religious nature).
155 Id. at 2103–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2109.
157 Id. at 2110.
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The central dispute in the 2019 case is whether a religious symbol, in particular
the Latin cross, can achieve such a secondary association to become a secular symbol,
with the majority holding that it can and the dissent arguing that it cannot.158 While
not expressly stated in terms of “secondary meaning,” this argument is also evident
from the “context” argument of the crèche, menorah, and Ten Commandment cases.159
In the next Section, we offer a brief overview of the secondary meaning doctrine in
trademark law, followed by an analysis of the application of secondary meaning to
religious symbols to determine how a symbol becomes a religious symbol and how
those religious symbols might develop a secondary meaning, allowing the govern-
ment to use them without violating the Establishment Clause.160
II. TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES EMPHASIZE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT IN
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF MARK PROTECTION
Context is a key concept in trademark law. Trademark law is rooted in the idea
that a mark, logo, slogan, or similar device can be associated with a product or service
to indicate the source of the product or service.161 Trademarks used in interstate and
international commerce are governed by the Lanham Act.162 The Lanham Act be-
came law in 1946 with the purpose of “the codification of all existing trademark
statutes, the carrying out by statute of our international commitments, the modern-
ization of the trademark statutes, remedying constructions of the present statutes,
and the simplification of trademark practice.”163 Next, we will look at general trade-
mark principles under the Lanham Act in order to determine their applicability to
Establishment Clause cases in the following Sections.164
A. Trademark Protection Generally
When one thinks of the association between a symbol, a word, or a mark, and
some product or service, one must consider the schema of trademark law and its
varying levels of protection.165 The level of protection a mark receives depends on
158 See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159 See generally McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
160 See infra Part II.
161 See Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act of Fifty-Some History and
Comment, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 442, 442–48 (1996).
162 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).
163 Pattishall, supra note 161, at 442 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, at 5 (1946)). Intrastate
trademarks are governed by state trademark law. See, e.g., Milton W. Handler, Are the State
Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 88 TRADEMARK
REP. 419, 437–38 (1998). The scope of protection and remedies may differ. See id.
164 See infra Section II.A.
165 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (outlining the application process for trademark registration).
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several factors and can change over time.166 It may be helpful to think of the protec-
tion as a continuum of protection levels instead of distinct levels that are triggered
by certain events or circumstances.167
Trademark law focuses on protecting an association between a good and the
source of that good.168 By statutory definition, a trademark is
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide inten-
tion to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal
register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish
his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.169
Trademark protection can be based on the nature of the mark, or on the context of
the mark with relation to the product.170 In general, the more unusual a mark or word
is that is associated with a product, the more protection it receives.171 Judge Friendly de-
scribed four classes of protection “in an ascending order which roughly reflects . . . the
degree of protection accorded [as] (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and
(4) arbitrary or fanciful.”172 Some commentators, and even the Supreme Court, have
separated this fourth category into two different categories, arguing that fanciful
marks, those created or made up specifically to serve as a trademark, are even more
protected than an existing mark that is used arbitrarily for an unrelated product.173
Fanciful trademarks occur when a company makes up a word or mark that does not
describe the product for which the mark is being used.174 Examples include Xerox,
Listerine, Advicor, and Velcro.175 Fanciful marks receive the greatest trademark
166 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
167 See id.
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
169 Id.
170 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9–11.
171 See, e.g., id. (describing the general trademark levels of protection).
172 Id. at 9.
173 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); see also Jake
Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. L.J. 731, 742 (2017).
174 See generally Linford, supra note 173 (describing fanciful trademarks but questioning
if any mark is truly unrelated to the product).
175 See id. at 741, 743 (noting Xerox and discussing cases related to Listerine and Advicor);
see also Thomas M. Dunlap, File Broadly, Clearly for Optimal Trademark Protection,
ASPATORE, May 2016, 2016 WL 3476385, at *3 (listing Exxon, Kodak, and Xerox as fanci-
ful marks); Velcro Companies to Public: It’s Hook and Loop, Not Velcro, VELCRO (Sept. 25,
2017), https://www.velcro.com/press-and-news/velcro-companies-public-hook-loop-not-velcro/
[https://perma.cc/ER6T-MYJL] (describing the Velcro mark).
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protection because they only exist to draw a connection between a product and a
manufacturer.176 Many common brands today might be considered fanciful because
they do not mean anything to the public, even if there was some original meaning.177
For example, A&W was named for the owners, Allen and Wright.178 EOS stands for
“Evolution of Smooth.”179 But, since neither of those definitions or meanings had
any meaning to the public (and probably still do not), these could be fanciful marks.180
A fanciful mark obtains protection because of the origin and nature of the mark
rather than the context of the use of the mark.181
Arbitrary marks, in contrast, require more consideration of context and consist
of “a pre-existing word [used] to sell a product unrelated to that word.”182 A common
example is that of Apple as a mark to distinguish cell phones and other technology.183
Another example, though possibly less widely known, is e.l.f.184 This common term for
a mythical creature is associated with makeup and stands for “eyes, lips, face.”185 These
marks do not inherently suggest the product being sold, but instead acquire meaning
through consumer association.186 Interestingly, these marks are considered very strong
marks and the “new meaning” for consumers does not have to be proven in order to
receive protection.187
At the opposite end of the spectrum are generic terms.188 These terms cannot be
protected as trademarks because the terms are so associated with the product itself
(and not the manufacturer or source of the product) that they cannot be or can no longer
be owned by a particular manufacturer.189 Marks that begin in a more protected cate-
gory may become generic over time.190 In an interesting continuum, companies may
176 See Linford, supra note 173, at 740–41.
177 See Madeline Raynor, 50 Acronyms and Initialisms All Spelled Out, MENTAL FLOSS
(May 8, 2018), https://mentalfloss.com/article/538094/acronyms-and-initialisms-spelled-out
?s=4 [https://perma.cc/8VVE-FFU9].
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Linford, supra note 173, at 743–44.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 739.
183 Id.; see also Steve Rivkin, How Did Apple Computer Get Its Brand Name?, BRANDING
STRATEGY INSIDER (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.brandingstrategyinsider.com/2011/11/how
-did-apple-computer-get-its-brand-name.html [https://perma.cc/75C6-QX7V] (noting that the
name came from a discussion soon after Steve Jobs returned from working at an apple orchard).
184 Raynor, supra note 177.
185 Id.
186 See Linford, supra note 173, at 744.
187 See id. at 745 (describing arbitrary trademarks as strong marks because they draw a
new connection between a common term and an unrelated product).
188 See Stephen R. Baird, Putting the Cart Before the Horse in Assessing Trademark
Validity—Toward Redefining the Inherently Generic Term, 14 J. CORP. L. 925, 927–28 (1989).
189 See id. at 929.
190 Id. at 930–31.
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spend years trying to build a strong link in the minds of consumers between their
product and their brand, only to have it become a generic term.191
Descriptive and suggestive marks both are characterized by an inherent relation-
ship between the mark and the word.192 The difference between the two is a matter
of degree and was described in 1968 this way: “A term is suggestive if it requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.
A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods.”193
Because suggestive marks require some imagination, they may be protected.194
An example would be “Chicken of the Sea.”195 This mark does not tell the consumer
what the product is, or describe the manufacturer, but it does evoke some images
that give the consumer some idea of what the product is.196
For descriptive marks, or marks that inherently relate to the product for which
it is used, proof of secondary meaning is required before the mark is protected.197
Secondary meaning is an inherently contextual analysis.198 Because secondary meaning
is the focus of our later discussion about religious symbols, some examples will help
illustrate the principles of secondary meaning.199
B. Secondary Meaning
In an early secondary meaning case, the Supreme Court emphasized the impor-
tance of drawing the relationship between a manufacturer and a product.200 In 1938,
191 See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (declaring the
term Aspirin generic); see also Velcro Brand, Don’t Say Velcro, YOUTUBE (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRi8LptvFZY [https://perma.cc/H63E-PVDF]. Velcro Brand
Companies have used humor to strengthen their trademark, including a follow-up video.
Velcro Brand, Thank You for Your Feedback—Don’t Say Velcro, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLWMQLMiTPk [https://perma.cc/654G-UX3V]. Even
the company that makes Band-Aid adhesive strips has gotten more aggressive in advertising.
Compare PhakeNam, 70’s Ads: Band-Aid Stuck on Band-Aid Brand, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAs QrngfFLw [https://perma.cc/27VU-QD8X] (1970s
commercial where the term “I am stuck on Band-Aid Brand” occurs several times), with Rewind
Me, Band-Aid Stuck on Band-Aid Jingle 90s Commercial (1997), YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M7KdFyaW_x8 [https://perma.cc/2CZP-NZSJ] (1997
commercial where every instance of the term Band Aid is followed by the term “brand”).
192 See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
193 Id.
194 See id.
195 Suggestive Trademark: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcoun
sel.com/suggestive-trademark [https://perma.cc/GT2B-PGDQ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
196 Id.
197 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
198 See infra Section II.B.
199 See infra Sections III.A–C.
200 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116–19 (1939).
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National Biscuit Company, Inc. sued Kellogg Company to stop it from using the term
“shredded wheat.”201 National Biscuit Company was the successor of the original
developer of the product known as shredded wheat.202 Kellogg Company introduced
a cereal called shredded wheat which had similar ingredients but a different manu-
facturing process.203 The United States Supreme Court determined that the term
“shredded wheat” was a generic term for the product that was not affiliated with any
particular manufacturer, thus rendering it ineligible for trademark status.204 The
Court rejected National Biscuit’s argument that the name was protected because it
had obtained a secondary meaning, linking the term to the specific product manu-
factured by National Biscuit’s predecessors at a particular plant at Niagara Falls.205
While the Court acknowledged that the Niagara Falls plant was the sole location for
producing any product named shredded wheat for several years, the Court stated that
National Biscuit had to show “that the primary significance of the term in the minds
of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.”206 The Court then
stated that National Biscuit failed to show that the term and the manufacturer were
so closely linked to create the secondary meaning.207
In 2000, the Third Circuit described secondary meaning as “exist[ing] when the
mark ‘is interpreted by the consuming public to be not only an identification of the
product or services, but also a representation of the origin of those products or ser-
vices.’”208 The court further stated that this secondary meaning is established by the
efforts of the manufacturer, intentionally drawing a connection between the mark
and the manufacturer’s version of the product.209 The court then stated that there was
no legal consensus as to how to develop a secondary meaning for a product.210 Even
so, it listed several factors, including: the extent of sales and advertising leading to
a connection in the minds of buyers, the length of use of the mark by the provider
of the good or service, how exclusively the provider used the mark before a compet-
itor began using it, customer surveys and testimony, the size of the provider, the
number of sales by the provider, and the number of provider customers.211 Thus, it
appears that secondary meaning is a function of consumer belief based on one or
many proxy measures.212
201 Id. at 113.
202 Id. at 113–14.
203 Id. at 114.
204 Id. at 116–17.
205 Id. at 118.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 118–19.
208 Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See id.
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In a 2018 dispute between Converse and Skechers, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit noted that trademark protection is founded in distinguishing a prod-
uct’s source.213 The court noted that this distinctiveness can be inherent or by “second-
ary meaning.”214 The key test for secondary meaning, according to the court, is whether
the public primarily identifies the mark with the source of a product or service in-
stead of with the product or service itself.215 It is language similar to this that the
Supreme Court used in the Latin cross case, debating whether the cross is primarily
affiliated with religion or with World War I.216 At the same time, the Court seemed
to argue over the use of the symbol in particular contexts.217
III. DETERMINING WHETHER TO APPLY TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES TO RELIGIOUS
SYMBOLS INVOLVES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SYMBOLIC MEANING
The debate within the Supreme Court seems to be related to two different
aspects of trademark law.218 First, is the relationship between a symbol and religion
based on the nature of the symbol (like a fanciful trademark)219 or is the relationship
between a symbol and religion related to context (similar to secondary meaning)?220
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not register “religious trademarks” but
does allow the registration of religious symbols as part of a trademark.221 For our
213 Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
214 Id.
215 Id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992)).
216 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089–90 (2019).
217 See id.
218 See, e.g., Linford, supra note 173, at 733; Vincent N. Palladino, Assessing Trademark
Significance: Genericness, Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 857 (2002).
219 See Linford, supra note 173, at 791.
220 See Palladino, supra note 218, at 859.
221 See, e.g., David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith: Trademarks, Religion
and Identity, 49 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 233, 268 (2008) (discussing trademark battles
between religious organizations, including splinter organizations and competing churches).
A search on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website reveals several trademarks that
include religious symbols: using the design code 24.13.01 (the design code for “Cross, Latin
(shorter horizontal lines); Latin cross (shorter horizontal lines)” reveals 6,733 trademarks and
a brief review of a sample of those show that they include the Latin cross but are not simply
the Latin cross. Trademark Electr. Search Sys. (TESS), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/dscm/dsc-24.htm#24 (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); see also U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe (last visited Apr. 14,
2020). A search for “menorah” shows it is part of the design code 13.01.01 “Candle holders,
candle sticks; Candles; Holders, candle; Menorah” and reveals 1,498 trademarks. Trademark
Elec. Search Sys. (TESS), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin
/gate.exe (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://
tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/dscm/dsc_13 .htm#13 (last visited Apr. 14, 2020). A review of those indi-
cate that many are not the menorah but are types of candles in the trademark. Some that do
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broader discussion about when the government’s use of religious symbols violates
the Establishment Clause, we must ask how to determine whether a symbol is a
religious symbol at all.
The key questions, in trademark terms, are: (1) how a symbol becomes a “religious
symbol”; (2) whether a religious symbol can lose its affiliation with religion because
it has become so ubiquitous that society no longer associates it with religion (akin
to becoming generic); and (3) whether the analysis of a religious symbol primarily
should be focused on context (something akin to secondary meaning).222 We address
each of these questions in turn.
To be clear, we are not proposing that religious symbols must meet any trade-
mark principle threshold to become religious symbols. We use trademark principles
here to demonstrate how the Court tends to view the meaning of the symbol to
determine whether a violation of the Establishment Clause has occurred.
A. The Application of Trademark Principles to the Acquisition of Symbols’
Religious Meaning
When does a symbol become a religious symbol? In part, this depends on who
you ask. In some religions, a symbol may have strong religious connotations to
some while meaning nothing to members of other religions. The question is broader
than whether a particular religion can claim protection or religious status for a symbol.
This question is whether a symbol is universally accepted as a religious symbol,
regardless of denomination or creed.223
Using trademark language, the easiest symbols to designate as religious would
be the equivalent of descriptive or suggestive marks.224 These marks would give the
general population some idea about the nature of the religion.225 For example, the
crèche may be considered a descriptive mark.226 An angel hovering over a stable,
while poorly dressed parents look at their newborn baby lying in a manger, shep-
herds kneel in worship, and richly dressed men stand to the side offering expensive
gifts might suggest that the religion centers around the baby and the circumstances
of the baby’s birth.227
include the menorah are “A Cup Full of Chutzpah Hebrew Coffee Estd 2018” (using a menorah
stylized as a cup of coffee), and a trademark identified as “enoch.” See Trademark Electr.
Search Sys. (TESS), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate
.exe (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
222 See Palladino, supra note 218, at 857–58, 860–62.
223 See generally Steven J. Olsen, Protecting Religious Identity with American Trademark
Law, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 131 (2013).
224 See Linford, supra note 173, at 738.
225 See id.
226 See, e.g., id.
227 See id. at 738–39.
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It also is easy to designate as “religious,” marks that are the equivalent of a fanciful
mark—that is, a mark created for the purpose of religious worship (like a mark that
might be invented or developed to identify a product).228 A highly fanciful example
would be the flying spaghetti monster of the purported Pastafarian religion.229 While
not deemed a “religion” by the courts, the symbol of a flying ball of spaghetti and
meatballs with tentacular eyes would indeed be a “creation” for the purpose of iden-
tifying the religion.230 A less fantastical example related to an acknowledged religion
would be the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ depiction of the angel
Moroni.231 That particular depiction or symbol did not exist until it was commis-
sioned for the construction of the Salt Lake City temple and has been affiliated with
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ever since.232
A bit more difficult to classify as religious are symbols that have become
affiliated with religion somewhat arbitrarily. There may be a reason for the affilia-
tion in the mind of the adherents of the religion, but to “outsiders,” the linkage seems
arbitrary.233 An arbitrary religious symbol would be a symbol that existed before it
was affiliated with the religion, would not have been inherently associated with the
religion, and yet has become affiliated with the religion.234 While arbitrary trade-
marks receive high levels of protection, one could argue that the secondary meaning
doctrine should apply to the designation of putative religious symbols that are not
fanciful, but are also not descriptive.235 The Latin cross would be such a symbol.236
228 See id. at 733–34.
229 See generally About, CHURCH OF THE FLYING SPAGHETTI MONSTER, https://www.ven
ganza.org/ [https://perma.cc/ENC6-FB8D] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020). The Pastafarian religion
was deemed a parody and not a true religion by U.S. District Court Judge John Gerrard in
Cavanaugh v. Bartlet, but the point remains that a flying spaghetti monster would be the equiv-
alent of a fanciful trademark worthy of the highest levels of protection as a religious symbol.
178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 829 (D. Neb. 2016).
230 See Cavanaugh, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 829, 833.
231 Lynn Arave, Angel Moroni Is a Prominent Church Symbol, DESERET NEWS (June 11,
2011), https://www.deseret.com/2011/6/11/20373376/angel-moroni-is-a-prominent-church
-symbol.html [https://perma.cc/KR6P-SXKF]. The authors mean no disrespect in using the
term “fanciful” to apply to a religious symbol of deep meaning to any particular faith. The
authors are merely drawing parallels to trademark law.
232 Id.
233 An example from business might be SUN Microsystems. To the consumer, this may
seem like an arbitrary mark, but to the owners, it stood for Stanford University Network. Lester
Earnest, Sun Microsystem’s Somewhat Crooked Startup, STAN. (June 20, 2017), http://web
.stanford.edu/~learnest/spin/sunup.html [https://perma.cc/7V76-NCCW].
234 See Linford, supra note 173, at 739.
235 See, e.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Can the PTO Find Its Way with Jesus?, 19 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2015) (arguing that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has been
too quick to allow registration of marks using the name or term “Jesus,” and arguing that it
should start requiring secondary meaning before registering those marks).
236 See Linford, supra note 173, at 739.
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At the time of the founding of Christianity, the cross was a device of torture and
death.237 And while it may be that Christians adopted the Latin cross as something
of a symbol of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the cross was not considered a wide-
spread symbol of the Christian faith until the reign of Constantine in the fourth
century.238 And so a symbol, completely unrelated to religion, became a symbol of
a worldwide religion.239
Another religious symbol, arbitrary in its origins, is the symbol of the fish, known
as an ichthys or ichthus.240 This symbol consists of two intersecting arcs meeting on
one end and with the other end extending beyond the meeting point to create what
can look like a fish tail.241 The symbol is not a descriptive or even suggestive symbol
as the religion is not about fish.242 It is not a fanciful symbol, as the fish symbol has
existed for centuries.243 Its affiliation with the Christian religion may require expla-
nation, making it an arbitrary application of a symbol to religion.244
As with trademarks, the key question is whether the symbol has become associ-
ated with religion in the minds of the public. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
defines trademark and service mark as such:
A trademark is generally a word, phrase, symbol, or design, or
a combination of these elements, that identifies and distinguishes
the source of one party’s goods from those of others. A service
mark is the same as a trademark except that it identifies and dis-
tinguishes the source of a service rather than goods.245
237 BRUCE W. LONGENECKER, THE CROSS BEFORE CONSTANTINE: THE EARLY LIFE OF A
CHRISTIAN SYMBOL 1–3 (2015).
238 Id. at 1–8.
239 The Latin cross may not be considered an arbitrary mark today because it has lost its
contemporaneous meaning as a device of torture and death. Even so, at the time, the appli-
cation of the device to identify adherents to a particular religion would have been the equivalent
of an arbitrary trademark. Id.
240 Elesha Coffman, What Is the Origin of the Christian Fish Symbol?, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2008), https://christianitytoday.com/history/2008/august/what-is-the-origin
-of-the-Christian-fish-symbol.html [https://perma.cc/A2WW-YHJN].
241 See, e.g., Blair Parke, Ichthys, The Christian Fish Symbol: 5 Origin and History Facts,
BIBLESTUDYTOOLS (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.biblestudytools.com/bible-study/topical
-studies/the-christian-fish-symbol-origin-and-history-facts.html [https://perma.cc/3BCW-BK
CB]; see also What Does the Christian Fish Symbol Mean (Ixthus/Icthus)?, GOTQUESTIONS,
https://www.gotquestions.org/Christian-fish-symbol.html [https://perma.cc/34RP-EHFF]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Christian Fish Symbol].
242 See supra notes 240–41.
243 See Coffman, supra note 240.
244 See Christian Fish Symbol, supra note 241 (explaining that the fish represents several
stories from the New Testament where Jesus fed multitudes with a small number of fish, and
ate fish with his disciples).
245 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: ENHANCING
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For our purposes, we would consider a “religious” symbol to be a symbol that is
identified with religion in a similar manner.
Once a symbol may be legitimately called a “religious symbol,” our next question
asks whether those symbols can ever lose their status as religious symbols, the equiva-
lency of becoming “generic” under trademark law.246
B. Can a Religious Symbol Become Generic or “Lose” Its Religious Association?
If a religious symbol is used too often by different religious organizations, that
symbol would not lose its “religiousness.” If a particular religion attempts to trademark
that symbol, it may be denied if other denominations use it or the public affiliates
that symbol with religion generally, but the symbol would still be “religious.”247 In
fact, several religious terms have been declared generic by various courts because
of their inability to distinguish between two different religions or sects—they fail
to identify the source—but those terms are still considered religious.248
It is a harder discussion when a religious symbol becomes affiliated with some-
thing other than religion. Justice Alito argued that the cross has become known as a
symbol for many things, including corporations, non-religious charities, and even
nations.249 The apparent debate between Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg focuses on
the question of whether the symbol has had a change of status.250 One could read
Justice Alito’s language to indicate that the Latin cross has become generic, and can
no longer be the subject of an Establishment Clause violation claim, as it is no
longer “religious.”251
Of course, just like the analysis under trademark law, the determination that a
symbol has lost its religious nature would be a fact-based, and possibly statistics-based,
analysis by a court.252 Aspirin was not generic until a court declared it so, and Velcro
and Band-Aid have taken steps to ensure that a court will not declare them generic.253
In addressing specifically religious symbols that are not considered the equiva-
lent of generic, we then ask: Is the critical factor in an Establishment Clause case the
context in which the symbol is being used? If so, can religious symbols have a
secondary meaning that is secular and that would allow the government to use them
without violating the Establishment Clause?
YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 2 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB4X-8K4R].
246 See Linford, supra note 173, at 745; see also Palladino, supra note 218, at 858–60.
247 See Palladino, supra note 218, at 858–60.
248 Olsen, supra note 223, at 135.
249 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2075 (2019).
250 See id. at 2074–78; id. at 2103–04.
251 See id. at 2075.
252 See Palladino, supra note 218, at 870, 873.
253 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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C. Do Secondary Meaning Principles Assist in the Establishment Clause Analysis?
It is important to note that Justice Alito did not expressly state that the cross was
a generic symbol that had lost its association with religion.254 Instead, he essentially
stated that the cross had acquired a secondary meaning.255 Problematic for Justice
Alito’s argument is the fact that he overgeneralizes the symbol by including many
types of crosses and not focusing on the Latin cross in particular.256
Even if we focus on the Latin cross in particular, Justice Alito seems to argue
that the Latin cross has become associated enough with World War I that it is not
primarily a religious symbol.257 Justice Ginsburg disagreed, also focusing on the
nature of the symbol instead of the context of the use.258
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Latin cross (in particular) is so entwined with
the Christian religion that it is impossible for it to become generic or even to have
a secular meaning in any context.259 To support her argument, Justice Ginsburg points
to statistics and surveys, stating, “To non-Christians, nearly 30% of the population
of the United States . . . the State’s choice to display the cross on public buildings
or spaces conveys a message of exclusion . . . .”260 In her view, the argument for
secondary meaning, as we see it in trademark law, does not support a secondary
meaning for the cross—that the public still sees this symbol as predominantly a
Christian symbol and there would be no secondary meaning.261
254 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2075.
255 See id. at 2090.
256 See LONGENECKER, supra note 237, at 12–18 (describing several types of crosses,
including the Byzantine T cross (which has no “arm” above the cross bar), the Latin cross
(also known as a body cross), the equilateral cross (where the four arms of the cross are equal
in length), the Egyptian Ankh (which has a loop at the top instead of a straight “arm”), the
gamma cross (made by connecting four Greek letter gammas together and that has developed
a secondary meaning as a swastika of World War II)).
257 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074–80.
258 Id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 2107.
260 Id. at 2106 (citing PEW RES. CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 4
(2015)).
261 Id. In 1984, Justice Brennan argued that one cannot remove the religious overtones of
a symbol simply by putting it in a somewhat secular situation. While dissenting in one of the
crèche cases, he stated:
[E]ven in the context of . . . [a] seasonal celebration, the crèche retains
a specifically Christian religious meaning. I refuse to accept the notion
implicit in today’s decision that non-Christians would find that the reli-
gious content of the crèche is eliminated by the fact that it appears as
part of the city’s otherwise secular celebration of the Christmas holiday.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 708 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course in that case,
the religious symbol at issue was the crèche, which we previously described as a descriptive
or suggestive symbol. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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The focus on the symbol itself creates a status argument instead of focusing on
the Establishment Clause question that asks if the use of the symbol establishes
religion.262 The Court should focus on the context of the use and the meaning of the
symbol within that context—essentially to ask what evidence is needed to show that
in a given context a religious symbol, which is not generic and still retains its religious
overtones, has acquired a secular meaning that overcomes the religious background
or history. In trademark law, the courts look to surveys, length of time of the use of
symbols in association with a particular company or source of the product, and how
widespread the use of the symbol is in relation to the particular company or source.263
By “flipping” the analysis, courts could look at surveys to demonstrate that the meaning
of the symbol is not primarily religious for those not affiliated with the particular
religion, as well as how widespread the use of the symbol is in non-religious con-
texts.264 This analysis does not cause a symbol to become less religious but does
indicate that in the mind of the general public (not of that faith), the symbol does not
send a religious message. Thus, we are not declaring a symbol no longer religious,
which might be seen as hostile to religion,265 but instead are declaring when that
symbol has become associated with secular meaning enough that non-adherents do
not see or feel the endorsement of that faith by the government.266
But does a declaration that a symbol has a particular secondary meaning to a
majority of the population assist in an Establishment Clause violation case? A key
underlying principle of the Establishment Clause, as stated by the Court, is neutral-
ity to religion.267 Using a statistical, or social science, approach to the meaning of
the symbol may be neutral enough to satisfy the Establishment Clause analysis. But
if the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect minority religions from the
establishment of a religion by the majority, the statistical analysis may not pass
constitutional muster.268 Are there examples where a symbol may pass this social
science survey type of analysis and be considered secular but would still send a mes-
sage of exclusion to the minority? Possibly. The question then becomes less statisti-
cal and more contextual.
262 See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074–78; id. at 2103–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
263 See, e.g., Lawrence G. Evans, Jr. & David M. Gunn, Trademark Surveys, 79 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1, 5 (1989).
264 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD.
L. REV. 713, 744–53 (2001) (outlining how to design a survey that is appropriate for collecting
information on religious symbols and public perception).
265 See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting hostility to religion is not mandated by the Establishment Clause).
266 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defin-
ing endorsement).
267 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
268 See supra Section I.A.3 and accompanying notes.
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D. An Approach for Analyzing the Establishment of Religion in Cases of
Religious Symbols
The Establishment Clause tests, from the Lemon test to the endorsement test, have
all included context.269 Justice Alito, in his opinion that seemed to indicate the ability
to develop a secular, secondary meaning for a religious symbol, also focused on the
historical, locational, and visual context of the symbol.270 Justice Ginsburg, on the other
hand, seemed to argue that some symbols cannot be secular no matter the context.271
Given the nature and importance of religion in society, and the confusion of the
Court in analyzing Establishment Clause cases, we posit that the Court should focus
on context as the determining factor in an Establishment Clause claim. Courts should
continue to use an endorsement test using trademark principles to assist in determin-
ing if a violation has occurred in the context of religious symbols.272 That modified
approach would ask the following questions:
1. What is the particular symbol at issue?
2. Is the symbol in question a religious symbol?
3. Does the symbol have a current, generally understood secular meaning
in addition to its religious meaning?
4. Will the use of the symbol, in the context it is used, send a message to
non-adherents of the religion that they are outsiders to the political
system?
One can use trademark principles to further refine the questions. The first question
looks at the specifics of the symbol being used. Guidelines from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office state, “When marks sound alike when spoken, are visually similar,
have the same meaning (even if in translation), and/or create the same general commer-
cial impression in the consuming public’s mind, the marks may be considered confus-
ingly similar.”273 Courts should use this type of definition to determine if the symbol
used by the government is sufficiently similar to an acknowledged religious symbol
to require further examination. If the symbol is similar to the religious symbol, then
the courts address the level of association between the mark and religion in the
second and third questions.
The second and third questions relate to distinctiveness and secondary meaning.
In trademark terms, question two asks if the mark is related to religion in a manner
similar to a fanciful mark,274 arbitrary mark,275 or a descriptive mark that has developed
269 See supra Section I.A and accompanying text.
270 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074–78 (2019).
271 See id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
272 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
273 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 245, at 4.
274 See Linford, supra note 173, at 733.
275 See id. at 739.
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a secondary meaning.276 The third question then asks if that mark has developed a
secular secondary meaning that lessens the association with religion or lowers the
“protection” of that symbol.
Finally, the fourth question asks if the symbol is being used in a religious context
or not. If a symbol is highly religious (fanciful or arbitrarily associated with reli-
gion) with little or no secular secondary meaning, then it would be seen as religious
in more contexts. If a symbol has become more generic or has developed a signifi-
cant secular secondary meaning, then the symbol may be used in more contexts
without violating the Establishment Clause.
To answer the questions, judges can look to statistical data, survey data, or
anecdotal evidence for the first three.277 For example, in the Latin Cross case, Justice
Ginsburg points out that less than four percent of the World War I memorials contain
a Latin cross and points out that the overwhelming majority of these memorials
contain no Latin cross, using statistics to refute the majority’s citation of seven
examples where the Latin cross in included in a war memorial.278 The final question
incorporates the context of the Lemon and endorsement tests and requires judicial
analysis to determine the reasonable impact of the use of the symbol on non-adher-
ents of the religion the symbol represents.279
Applying these questions to the prior cases related to religious symbols may or
may not result in different outcomes but will result in a consistent analysis. In evaluat-
ing the displays of the crèche, or manger scene,280 the first two questions are easy
to answer—the manger scene is a religious symbol that portrays the Christian story
of the birth of Jesus Christ. Question three is likely also easy to answer—the manger
scene does not have a generally secular meaning.281 In no case before the Supreme
Court was there any indication that the crèche had a secular meaning.282 Even if one
imparted a secondary meaning related to Christmas on the manger scene, the pur-
pose of the manger scene with regard to Christmas is to portray the Christian origins
of the holiday.283 The final question then becomes the key question in the case.
In the Rhode Island case, where the crèche was displayed with many secular sym-
bols, the court held that the context related to the history of the holiday and did not send
a religious message.284 The Pennsylvania crèche case also looked to context related to
the menorah which was part of a larger display to hold it was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause, but for the crèche that was standing alone in a courthouse, the
276 See Palladino, supra note 218, at 859.
277 See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 264, at 744–53.
278 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2111 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
279 See supra notes 10–13, 23–24 and accompanying text.
280 See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
281 See id. at 695–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282 See id. at 695–98.
283 See id. at 695; Palladino, supra note 218, at 859.
284 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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context sent a message that the county endorsed Christianity.285 Rather than using
language that might secularize the symbol, the Court could simply acknowledge that
the presence of a religious symbol in this context does not send a message of non-
inclusion to non-adherents of the religion.286
With regard to the Ten Commandments cases,287 again the first two questions
are simple to answer. The Ten Commandments, as articulated on the statues or
plaques, would be the symbol and are clearly religious in nature, given their origin
in the Bible (or Torah).288 The question of whether there is a secular meaning for the
Ten Commandments also is fairly clear. The Ten Commandments do not have a
generally accepted secular purpose or meaning. They are inherently and completely
religious. The question then becomes the context. Does the use of the Ten Com-
mandments as part of a display that is clearly labeled as a display on the sources of
law and includes other religious texts, as well as secular government documents
(such as the Constitution, Magna Carta, etc.), send a message that the government
is endorsing religion?289 That is a question the Court must answer. But instead of
secularizing the symbol, the Court should embrace the religious symbol and assess
whether the message being sent is one of endorsement.
The same analysis occurs with the Latin cross. In the most recent case, the
Justices disagreed on the definition of the symbol being used, with Justice Alito
looking at a broad definition of “cross” and Justice Ginsburg focusing on the particular
“Latin cross.”290 Under our proposed first question regarding the particular symbol
being used, Justice Alito should focus his discussion on the cross to the Latin cross
instead of the Greek cross as represented by the Red Cross, Blue Cross Blue Shield,
and other businesses. In answering question two, all of the Justices agreed that the
Latin cross is a religious symbol.291 Even Justice Alito acknowledged that the Latin
cross was primarily a religious symbol.292
The Justices likely would disagree on whether there is a current, generally under-
stood secular meaning. The argument could go something like this: The Latin cross is
a religious symbol, but it also has a relationship to World War I. That relationship was
relevant in the early 1900s but may not be as relevant now. Do people today affiliate
the Latin cross with the war? The answer to the question would rely in part on some
sort of social research. Data would be needed. At a minimum, Justice Alito and Jus-
tice Ginsburg would require more statistics and more numbers on which to base a
285 See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
286 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 613–14 (1989) (“The menorah is the primary
visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions.”).
287 See supra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
290 See supra Section I.B.3.
291 See supra Section I.B.3.
292 See supra Section I.B.3.
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decision.293 In the Latin cross case, Justice Ginsburg’s numbers are quite clear: she
notes that of the forty World War I displays in the United States that include a Latin
cross only constitute four percent of the World War I monuments in the nation.294
The fourth question is again key. If the data shows that the Latin cross is heavily
associated with World War I, the Justices can use information in the weight of the
analysis, but the basic question still is whether its use sends a message to non-
Christians (in this case) that they are outsiders to the political system, or does the
context of the Latin cross reduce or eliminate that message?
To be fair to Justice Alito, in his Latin Cross opinion, he also stated:
The cross came into widespread use as a symbol of Christianity
by the fourth century, and it retains that meaning today. But there
are many contexts in which the symbol has also taken on a secular
meaning. Indeed, there are instances in which its message is now
almost entirely secular.295
The proposed test does not eliminate the ability of the Court to make reasoned
judgments, nor does it eliminate the possibility for disagreement. It does, however,
give guidance to the Court on how to approach a religious symbol case. It takes
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, especially the endorsement modifica-
tion of the Lemon test,296 and applies some trademark principles to help the Court
assess the message that the symbol sends to the public.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly with
regard to religious symbols, is a complicated body of multiple tests and pronounce-
ments.297 When determining whether a governmental use of a purported religious
symbol violates the Establishment Clause, the Court can use some basic trademark
principles to help articulate its positions and results.298 The articulated approach
proposed in this Article incorporates those principles to assist a court in systemati-
cally evaluating a symbol to determine if it is a religious symbol, if it has any promi-
nent secular affiliations or meanings, and whether the context of the use violates the
Establishment Clause. This proposal is not a magic formula that will ensure total
predictability in Establishment Clause cases but it should assist the Court in assess-
ing the key underlying issues in an establishment question regarding the effect of the
government’s interaction with religion and whether it “establishes” religion.
293 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2079 (2019); id. at 2102–04
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 2111 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
295 Id. at 2074 (majority opinion).
296 See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
297 See supra Section I.B.
298 See supra Section III.A.
